Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 2

Issue 2

Article 3

5-1-2007

Relaxing the Noose Around Tying Arrangements: Reifert v. South
Central Wisconsin MLS Corp. Exposes Problems with the Per Se
Analysis
Paul C. Mallon Jr.
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul C. Mallon Jr., Relaxing the Noose Around Tying Arrangements: Reifert v. South Central Wisconsin
MLS Corp. Exposes Problems with the Per Se Analysis, 2 Seventh Circuit Rev. 471 (2007).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/3

This Antitrust is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Mallon: Relaxing the Noose Around Tying Arrangements: <em>Reifert v. Sout

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

RELAXING THE NOOSE AROUND TYING
ARRANGEMENTS: REIFERT V. SOUTH CENTRAL
WISCONSIN MLS CORP. EXPOSES PROBLEMS
WITH THE PER SE ANALYSIS
PAUL C. MALLON, JR.∗
Cite as: Paul C. Mallon, Jr., Relaxing the Noose Around Tying Arrangements:
Reifert v. South Central Wisconsin MLS Corp. Exposes Problems with the Per Se
Analysis, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 471 (2007), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v22/mallon.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court defined the elements for per se
condemnation of tying arrangements in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde1 and reaffirmed the Jefferson Parish majority’s
framework in its recent Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc. decision.2 Shortly after Jefferson Parish, however, the Seventh
Circuit modified the Supreme Court’s test by adding an entirely
separate element, the “economic interest requirement,” that plaintiffs
must show for the court to condemn a tying arrangement as illegal per
se.3 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit rethought this revision of
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. Business Administration, June 2004, Michigan State University.
Paul C. Mallon, Jr. would like to thank his family for their continuing support,
encouragement, and guidance.
1
466 U.S. 2 (1984)
2
126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006) (concluding that tying arrangements involving patents
“should be evaluated under the standards applied in . . . Jefferson Parish”).
3
Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d
203 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Supreme Court doctrine, and criticized the implementation of the
economic interest requirement under the Jefferson Parish per se tying
framework.4
In June 2006, however, Judge Flaum’s majority opinion in Reifert
v. South Central Wisconsin MLS Corp. reasserted the economic
interest requirement as a prerequisite to finding a tying arrangement
illegal per se.5 Concurring in Reifert’s outcome, Judge Wood
explained that the majority was improperly anticipating the Supreme
Court’s overruling of prior precedent.6 This Comment analyzes the
propriety of the economic interest requirement in the Supreme Court’s
per se tying analysis and concludes that the Jefferson Parish majority
does not endorse its implementation as a requisite for a tying violation.
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s per se tying analysis’s ability to
achieve the goals of an antitrust per se standard is examined, resulting
in a prediction that the per se analysis will be abandoned in the future.
The per se analysis in tying arrangements is not as straightforward
as the per se analysis in other areas of antitrust law.7 As a result, this
Comment begins in Part I with an assay into the history of the
Supreme Court’s treatment of tying arrangements and the circuit
courts’ implementation of the economic interest requirement into the
per se tying analysis. It continues in Part II with an explanation of the
majority and concurring analyses of tying arrangements in the Seventh
Circuit’s recent Reifert decision. Part III examines in detail the
arguments favoring and condemning the implementation of the
economic interest requirement in a per se tying analysis and concludes
that the requirement should not be used as a prerequisite for per se
illegality of a tying arrangement under existing Supreme Court
doctrine. Finally, Part IV analyzes the efficacy of the per se standard

4

Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.

1987).
5

450 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2006)
Id. at 323 (Wood, J. concurring).
7
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) for an
example of a classic per se analysis of a price fixing agreement.
6
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as it applies to tying arrangements, and predicts that its time as the
prevailing test for tying arrangements is limited.
I. TYING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Precluding contractual arrangements that have anticompetitive
effects in the marketplace is an important objective of antitrust law.8
One such contractual arrangement, long recognized by the Supreme
Court to have anticompetitive effects on the marketplace, is the tying
arrangement.9 A tying arrangement is an agreement to sell a product
(the tying product) only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a
different product (the tied product), or at least agree not to purchase
that product from any other supplier.10 Early Supreme Court
jurisprudence held that tying arrangements had few, if any, redeeming
qualities.11 Due to this harsh perspective on tying arrangements, the
Court began to treat them as illegal per se.12 The requirements for per
8

See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. §14
(2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations.” Sherman Act § 1. Section 3 of the
Clayton Act prohibits the sale or contract for sale of goods on the condition that the
purchaser refuses to deal with a competitor where the effect of the condition is to
lessen competition or create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Clayton Act § 3.
9
See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United
States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
10
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Carl Sandberg Vill.
Condo. Ass’n v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1985); Buyer’s
Corner Realty, Inc. v. N. Ky. Ass’n of Realtors, 410 F. Supp. 2d 574, 578 (E.D. Ky.
2006).
11
N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6 (“[tying arrangements] deny competitors free
access to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying
requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of his power or
leverage in another market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free
choice between competing products.”); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949) (explaining that tying arrangements are almost always
anticompetitive).
12
Int’l Salt 332 U.S. at 396.
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se illegality of tying arrangements have progressively changed since
the Court started analyzing them,13 and the current test involves more
of an economic inquiry than the classic antitrust per se analysis.14 The
current per se analysis of tying arrangements has been criticized often
in recent history,15 but the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to
overrule it.16
A. The Per Se Tying Analysis is Born
Certain arrangements produce anticompetitive restraints so
harmful to competition that the character of the restraint is a sufficient
basis for presuming the arrangement is unreasonable under our
antitrust laws.17 These arrangements are condemned as unreasonable
per se without an intensive analysis of the arrangement’s actual market
effects.18
The per se treatment of tying under antitrust law can be traced
back to the turn of the twentieth century in cases involving patent
misuse.19 In Motion Picture Patents Company v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co. the Supreme Court addressed a licensing
agreement allowing use of a patented movie projection machine only
for projecting certain films, which were neither part of the patented

13

See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
14
See supra note 7.
15
Ill. Tool Works Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1291; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35
(O’Connor, J. concurring); 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1730d (2d ed. 2004).
16
Ill. Tool Works Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1291; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 10.
17
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 10.
18
Id.
19
See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917). The plaintiff in this case patented a part on a movie projection machine
which feeds film through the machine. Id. The machines with the patented parts were
sold on the condition that the machines “be used solely for exhibiting or projecting
motion pictures” also owned by the plaintiff. Id.
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machine, nor patented themselves.20 The Court found this arrangement
was illegal because the patentee was extending its legal monopoly on
movie projectors to the movie film market.21 This holding overturned
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,22 a decision made by the Court just five years
prior, that a patentee may impose such conditions on a patent.23 The
Court justified this change by citing the then-recently enacted Clayton
Act § 3, which it saw as a possible congressional response to its
decision in A.B. Dick.24
The House Report corresponding to section 3 of the Clayton Act
clearly explains the prevailing attitude toward tying arrangements at
the time it was drafted.25 According to the Clayton Act House Report,
tying arrangements are “one of the greatest agencies and
instrumentalities of monopoly ever devised by the brain of man.”26
The report continues in equally strong and dramatic language: “[the
tying arrangement] completely shuts out competitors, not only from
trade in which they are already engaged, but from the opportunities to
build up trade in any community where these great and powerful
combinations are operating under this system and practice.”27 This
outright condemnation of tying arrangements by Congress
20

Id. at 508.
Id. at 517. (explaining that “the owner intends to and does derive its profit,
not from the invention on which the law gives it a monopoly, but from the
unpatented supplies with which it is used, and which are wholly without the scope of
the patent monopoly, thus in effect extending the power to the owner of the patent to
fix the price to the public of the unpatented supplies as effectively as he may fix the
price on the patented machine”).
22
224 U.S. 1 (1912). The agreement at issue in A.B. Dick conditioned the sale
of a patented duplication machine on the promise to purchase all paper and ink from
the duplication machine manufacturer only. Id.
23
Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 518.
24
Id. at 517 (explaining that the Court is “confirmed” in its conclusion to
overrule A.B. Dick by the Clayton Act § 3, which Congress drafted “as if in
response” to the Court’s holding in A.B. Dick).
25
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 n.15 (1984)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, at 12-13 (1914)).
26
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11 n.15.
27
Id.
21
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demonstrates the viewpoint that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any
purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”28 Such a negative
outlook on all arrangements to sell two products together, however, is
rejected today.29
The Supreme Court first explicitly applied the per se rule to tying
arrangements in International Salt Co. v. United States.30 In this case,
International Salt (then, the largest producer of salt for commercial
purposes) owned patents on two machines for the “utilization of salt
products.”31 International Salt leased the machines to over 800
separate lessees on the condition that the lessees purchase all salt for
use in the machines from International Salt.32 The Court found that the
tying arrangement was unreasonable per se because it foreclosed
competitors from a market.33 In its analysis, however, the Court
appeared to treat two aspects as threshold determinations, necessary
before finding the tying arrangement unreasonable per se.34 The Court
first determined that International Salt had market power in the tying
market.35 Then, the Court justified its decision to condemn the
arrangement per se by explaining that the volume of business it
28

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949)
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11 (explaining that “not every refusal to sell
two products separately can be said to restrain competition”).
30
332 U.S. 392 (1947)
31
Id. at 394 (The first machine, the Lixator, turned rock salt into a brine useful
in industrial products; the second, the Saltomat, injected salt into canned products).
32
Id. at 395 n.5.
33
Id. at 396, 398 (explaining that competitors are able to produce salt of the
same quality as International Salt, and are shut out of the market by a provision that
“limits [the market], not in terms of quality, but in terms of a particular vendor”).
34
Id. at 395-96.
35
Id. (finding market power in the tying market from International Salt’s
patented machines, the Court stated, “[f]rom [the patents] appellant derives a right to
restrain others from making, vending or using the patented machines”).
The market power requirement is explained further in N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States: “where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying product so that it
does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into taking the tied item
any restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be
insignificant at most.” 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
29
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affected was not insubstantial.36 These two conditions spurred the
Supreme Court’s progressive refining of the per se tying definition,
discussed ahead.
Six years later, the Court addressed a tying arrangement again in
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.37 This case dealt with
the New Orleans newspaper industry, wherein there was one morning
and two evening newspapers.38 The Times-Picayune Publishing
Company owned the sole morning newspaper, and one of the two
evening newspapers.39 According to Times-Picayune’s contract for
sale of advertising space, potential advertisers had to purchase an
advertisement in both the morning and the evening newspapers (the
tying and tied product, respectively).40
The Times-Picayune Court allowed the arrangement requiring
purchasers of classified advertising space to purchase space in both the
morning and evening papers.41 The Court assessed the market for
classified advertising in New Orleans newspapers,42 and found that the
Times-Picayune morning newspaper held a forty percent share of the
relevant market for classified advertising.43 The Court held that this
share did not comprise the type of market power required under
International Salt.44 Most notably from a historical standpoint,
however, the Court also explained that the agreement could not be
condemned because it did not involve two separate products.45 The
36

Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. 396.
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
38
Id. at 598-602.
39
Id. at 598.
40
Id. at 599-600.
41
Id. at 596-97.
42
Id. at 612 (surveying the sales of all advertising in New Orleans newspapers
and deciding that the Times-Picayune was not dominant in the newspaper
advertising market in the city).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 612-13.
45
Id. at 614 (explaining that “[t]he common core of the adjudicated unlawful
tying arrangements is the forced purchase of a second distinct commodity with the
37
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Times-Picayune Court’s analysis added this separate-product
requirement to the two threshold requirements for per se treatment of
tying arrangements promulgated in International Salt.
While the Times-Picayune Court recognized the International Salt
threshold requirements for per se treatment of tying arrangements, its
opinion deviated somewhat from the International Salt analysis.46 The
Supreme Court clearly restated its conception of the per se rule against
tying arrangements in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States
(“NPRC”).47 In 1864 and 1870 the United States government granted
the defendant approximately forty million acres of land across the
continent on which to build a railroad.48 The land was granted in belts
that ranged from twenty to forty miles wide.49 The railroad sold some
of the land and maintained and leased out the rest of the land.50 The
sales contracts and lease agreements included a clause requiring the
owners or lessees to use the defendant’s railroad lines for shipping all
commodities made on the land.51 The United States brought suit
claiming these contracts constituted illegal tying arrangements.52
The NPRC Court addressed this tying arrangement, whereby the
defendant railroad company sold parcels of land it owned (the tying
good) on the condition that the owners of that land use the railroad
company for all their shipping needs (the tied service).53 The Supreme
desired purchase of a dominant ‘tying’ product, resulting in economic harm to
competition in the ‘tied’ market”).
46
The Court deviated from the International Salt holding in that it (1) required
actual proof of market power in the tying product market, and (2) used slightly
different analyses for tying under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the
Clayton Act. Id. at 608-09, 610-13.
47
356 U.S. 1 (1958).
48
Id. at 2.
49
Id. at 3.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 3-4.
53
Id. Also note that the Court addressed this arrangement under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, and not the Clayton Act because the Clayton Act applies only to
commodities and land is not a commodity. Id. at 14 n.1.
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Court emphasized that tying arrangements are “unreasonable in and of
themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in
the market for the tied product and a ‘not insubstantial’ amount of
interstate commerce is affected.”54 In holding the arrangement
unreasonable per se, the Court inferred market power in the tying
product (land for sale) because the railroad company was given large
tracts of land by the government.55 Additionally, the Court inferred a
“not insubstantial” effect on commerce by the nature of the
agreement.56
Despite the emphatic argument in the dissent, the NPRC majority
implied that tying is treated the same under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, and section 3 of the Clayton Act, and that proof of market power
in the tying market is unnecessary.57 Additionally, the NPRC Court
referred to the defendant’s use of market power to induce large
numbers of customers to give it preference over its competitors as
“leverage.”58 The leverage concept continues to be important in tying
arrangement analysis today.59 NPRC showcases the strict per se

54

Id. at 6 (citing Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)).
N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 7.
56
Id. at 12 (stating that no matter what possible redeeming qualities the tying
agreements may have, the “essential fact remains that these agreements are binding
obligations held over the heads of vendees which deny defendant's competitors
access to the fenced-off market on the same terms as the defendant”).
57
See id. at 13-14 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (arguing that tying agreements
assessed under Sherman Act § 1 “raise legal issues different from those presented by
the legislatively defined tying clauses invalidated under the more pointed
prohibitions of the Clayton Act,” and that “both proof of dominance in the market
for the tying product and a showing that an appreciable volume of business in the
tied product is restrained are essential conditions to judicial condemnation of a tying
clause as a per se violation of the Sherman Act”) (emphasis in original).
58
Id., 356 U.S. at 7
59
See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1700d (stating that “[t]he
original, continuing, and most fundamental concern about tying is ‘leverage’”); 5
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1134a (1981) (defining
leverage as “a supplier’s power to induce his customer for one product to buy a
55
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treatment of tying arrangements in the Court’s early cases.60 The
Court’s approach to tying arrangements began to change through the
1960’s and 1970’s.61
B. Changing Per Se Illegality
The Supreme Court’s change from its rigid analysis of tying
arrangements to a more cautious approach, requiring more proof of
market power and anticompetitive effects, is exemplified through its
decisions in Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.62
(“Fortner I”) and United States Steel Corp v. Fortner Enterprises
Inc.63 (“Fortner II”). The plaintiff in Fortner I filed a tying
arrangement suit against defendants, U.S. Steel and U.S. Steel Homes
Credit Corp., its wholly-owned subsidiary credit corporation (the
“Credit Corporation”).64 The alleged tying arrangement in Fortner I65
required corporations and individuals to purchase prefabricated steel
homes from U.S. Steel (the tied product) as a condition to obtaining
financing from the Credit Corporation (the tying service).66 The
plaintiff explained that he agreed to purchase the prefabricated steel
homes so he could obtain financing for 100 percent of his land from
the Credit Corporation; no other company would provide him that
service.67 Fortner I was granted certiorari after the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the defendants in a
second product from him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the merit
of that second product”).
60
For another example of a strict per se analysis, see Fortner Enters. Inc. v.
U.S. Steel Corp. (“Fortner I”), 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
61
This change has been credited to the Chicago-School’s influence on antitrust
law during that period. See Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and
Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001).
62
394 U.S. 495 (1969).
63
429 U.S. 610 (1977).
64
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 496-97.
65
And in Fortner II.
66
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 497.
67
Id. at 504.
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summary judgment proceeding on the grounds that the plaintiff failed
to establish sufficient market power in the tying service.68
The Supreme Court first rejected the district court’s finding that
the plaintiff could not proceed on the merits of the case where it failed
to prove market power in the tying service.69 The Court then turned to
whether the plaintiff pled facts which, if proved at trial, could render
the defendants’ tying arrangement illegal per se.70 In finding that the
plaintiff pled sufficient facts showing economic power in the tying
service, the Court emphasized that the Credit Corporation’s terms were
“uniquely and unusually advantageous.”71 From this, the Court
inferred that the Credit Corporation had “unique economic
advantages” over its competitors.72 In other words, the Court held that
sufficient market power in the tying market could be shown because
the rate offered by the credit company was unique.73 Therefore, the
Supreme Court found that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of
action and allowed the case to proceed.74 The Fortner I decision came

68

Fortner Enters. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 762, 768 (W.D. Ky. 1966),
aff’d 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968), rev’d 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
69
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 500 (explaining that a finding that the plaintiff failed
to meet the standards of Int’l Salt and NPRC cannot be fatal for the plaintiff’s
antitrust case, and that “[a] plaintiff can still prevail on the merits whenever he can
prove, on the basis of a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects of
the practices involved, that the general standards of the Sherman Act have been
violated”). Here, the Court meant that even if the agreement is not per se illegal as a
tying arrangement, it may be illegal under the rule of reason, which is explained
infra note 104.
70
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 500-01.
71
Id. at 504-505 (the Court was referring specifically to the Credit
Corporation’s ability to provide financing for 100 percent of the purchase price of a
plot of land).
72
Id.
73
However, the Court added in a footnote that “[u]niqueness confers economic
power only when other competitors are in some way prevented from offering the
distinctive product themselves." Id. at 506 n.2. This footnote became important in
Fortner II.
74
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 510.
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with four dissenting Justices, foreshadowing the different outcome in
Fortner II.75
Eight years after the Court decided Fortner I, the same case came
knocking at its door; this time, the issue was whether the credit
company actually had sufficient economic power in the tying market.76
Unlike in Fortner I, the Court in Fortner II was not hasty to infer
market power in the tying market from the uniqueness of the tying
producer’s product.77 While the Court asserted that its decision in
Fortner II was consistent with Fortner I, it held that the plaintiff failed
to establish market power in the tying service.78 In Fortner II, the
Court refused to infer that the Credit Corporation held sufficient
market power in the credit industry because of U.S. Steel’s size, and
likewise refused to infer market power from the fact that a large
number of purchasers accepted the tied package.79 The Court also
rejected the inference of market power from the noncompetitive price
charged for the tied product (building materials for houses).80

75

United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. Inc., (“Fortner II”), 429 U.S.
610 (1977).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 622; see also James P. Melican, Jr., Antitrust Developments: Tying
Arrangements and Related Restrictions after Fortner II, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 157,
n.13 (1982) (stating that “[a]lthough Justice Stevens went to great pains to stress that
there was nothing inconsistent between the Supreme Court's opinions in Fortner I
and II, many commentators and more than a few judges seem to have concluded that
the signals did in fact change).
78
Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 615 (the plaintiff asserted that market power was
present from four factors: “(1) petitioner Credit Corp. and the Home Division were
owned by one of the Nation's largest corporations; (2) petitioners entered into tying
arrangements with a significant number of customers in addition to Fortner; (3) the
Home Division charged respondent a noncompetitive price for its prefabricated
homes; and (4) the financing provided to Fortner was ‘unique,’ primarily because it
covered one hundred percent of Fortner's acquisition and development costs”).
79
Id. at 617-19 n.10.
80
Id. at 618.
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Perhaps most surprising,81 considering the direction in which the
Court seemed to be going with respect to inferring market power in
Fortner I, was its refusal to infer market power from the uniqueness of
the Credit Corporation’s service.82 The Court decided that in the
absence of proof that the Credit Corporation had a cost advantage in
the tying market, the credit company could not have “the kind of
uniqueness considered relevant” in tying arrangement analysis.83 In its
Fortner II opinion, the Court emphasized footnote 2 of Fortner I,
which required the tying product to have a competitive advantage in
the tying market in order to infer market power from uniqueness.84
The Court in Fortner II used this competitive advantage requirement
to justify its holding that the credit company’s service did not have the
type of uniqueness that requires an inference of market power.85 These
requirements highlighted in Fortner II seemed similar to the analysis
in Times-Picayune that started to stray from the International Salt
strict per se analysis; however, the Court still referred to its analysis as
a per se inquiry.86
C. The Per Se Analysis under the Supreme Court Today
While the changing views of the per se rule for tying
arrangements explained above may make the rule seem somewhat
unstable, one maxim has emerged from the previously examined cases
81

Melican, supra note 77, at n.16 (remarking, “[t]he Supreme Court's
conclusion in Fortner II that Fortner had simply failed to sustain the burden of proof
of sufficient economic power the Court had outlined in Fortner I must have come as
a surprise to more than a few of the lawyers and judges involved in the long history
of that case”).
82
Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620-21.
83
Id.
84
See note 73 supra.
85
Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 621-22 (holding that “if the evidence merely shows
that credit terms are unique because the seller is willing to accept a lesser profit -- or
to incur greater risks -- than its competitors, that kind of uniqueness will not give rise
to any inference of economic power in the credit market”).
86
Id. at 612.
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and has remained at the forefront of the tying analysis: “the essential
characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s
exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into
the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all,
or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.”87
This concept reflects the decisions and emphasized policies contained
in many of the previously addressed cases.
The Supreme Court majority in Jefferson Parish clung strongly to
the per se rule for contractual tying arrangements in a hotly-contested
opinion that has since endured.88 The five-to-four decision in Jefferson
Parish saw all nine Justices agree in upholding the arrangement at
issue, but disagree on the appropriate road to that conclusion.89
Despite the arguments against the application of the per se rule
contained in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, Justice Stevens’
majority opinion proclaimed, “[i]t is far too late in the history of our
antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and
therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”90
The tying arrangement in Jefferson Parish consisted of a contract
between a hospital (the “Hospital”) and a firm of anesthesiologists (the
“Firm”) establishing the Firm as the sole provider of anesthesia in the
Hospital.91 The plaintiff asserted that this agreement constituted a per
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act as a tying arrangement
because patients at the Hospital must use an anesthesiologist from the
Firm.92
Justice Stevens began his majority opinion by explaining the
importance of “forcing” (derived from the concept of leverage) in the
87

See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1286 (2006)
(citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984)).
88
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2.
89
See id.
90
Id. at 10.
91
Id. at 4. The tying service in this agreement was hospital care; the tied
service was “anesthesiological services.” Id. at 2.
92
Id.
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per se tying arrangement analysis.93 He then delved into the
appropriate threshold requirements a court must address before finding
a tying arrangement is unreasonable per se.94 The majority recognized
that a prerequisite for condemning tying arrangements under the per se
rule is the existence of “some special ability [held by the seller]—
usually called ‘market power’—to force a purchaser to do something
that he would not do in a competitive market.”95 A second threshold
requirement recognized by the Jefferson Parish majority as necessary
for per se condemnation of a tying arrangement is the foreclosure of “a
substantial volume of commerce” by the arrangement.96 The majority
concluded its explanation of the per se rule’s threshold requirements
by asserting that a tying arrangement requires the sale of two separate
products or services.97 This statement of the requirements for per se

93

Id. at 12 (explaining that “forcing” exists where the seller can exploit “its
control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product
that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase
elsewhere on different terms,” and that when “‘forcing’ is present, competition on
the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is
violated”).
94
Id. at 12-19.
95
Id. at 13-17 (explaining in dicta that market power in the tying product,
which makes forcing likely, exists where (1) the seller has a patent or similar
monopoly, (2) the seller’s share of the market is high, or (3) the seller is able to offer
a unique product that competitors are unable to offer).
96
Id. at 16 (stating, “when a purchaser is ‘forced’ to buy a product he would
not have otherwise bought even from another seller in the tied-product market, there
can be no adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market which
would otherwise have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed”); but see
id. at 12 (explaining that an invalid tying arrangement exists where the buyer was
forced “into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all,
or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms”) (emphasis
added).
97
Id. at 18 (holding, “we must consider whether petitioners are selling two
separate products that may be tied together, and, if so, whether [the defendants] have
used their market power to force their patients to accept the tying arrangement”).
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illegality of tying arrangements continues to constitute the test favored
by the Supreme Court when addressing tying arrangements.98
After analyzing the services offered by the Hospital and the Firm,
the majority concluded that “anesthesiological services and the other
hospital services” are separate products, and are treated so by
patients.99 The Court then moved on to the market power requirement
and found the Hospital lacked sufficient market power to force the tie
on consumers.100 The majority upheld the tying arrangement because
the plaintiff’s only evidence of market power was a “preference” for
services from the Hospital.101 The Court stated that such a preference
is not probative of significant market power especially where seventy
percent of the Jefferson Parish (where the Hospital is located)
residents enter other hospitals.102
Justice O’Connor authored the concurrence in Jefferson Parish
(joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist)
calling for the abandonment of the per se standard for tying
arrangements.103 The concurrence asserted that the only proper way to
assess the validity of tying arrangements is through a rule of reason
analysis.104 The approach to analyzing tying arrangements proposed
by Justice O’Connor includes three requirements that the agreement
98

See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1286, 1291
(2006); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
99
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-20.
100
Id. at 26
101
Id.
102
Id. at 26-27 (stating that “[t]he fact that a substantial majority of the
parish’s residents elect not to enter East Jefferson means that the geographic data do
not establish the kind of dominant market position that obviates the need for further
inquiry into actual competitive conditions”).
103
Id. at 35 (arguing that “[t]he time has . . . come to abandon the ‘per se’ label
and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic
benefits, that the tie may have”).
104
A rule of reason analysis (the alternative to a per se analysis in antitrust)
focuses on whether a contract actually unreasonably restrains competition. This uses
an inquiry into the actual economic benefits and detriments the particular agreement
causes in the market, and analyzes each individual agreement separately. Id. at 30,
41 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
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must meet in order to warrant further inquiry of the arrangement;105
Justice O’Connor insists however, that a tying arrangement meeting all
three requirements should still be upheld if it creates sufficient
economic benefits.106
The arguments contained in the Jefferson Parish concurrence
have been well-received by some scholars, and even judges.107
However, the per se analysis explained by the majority remains the
analysis used today in assessing contractual tying arrangements.108
A recent Supreme Court decision upheld the Jefferson Parish
majority’s per se analysis of tying arrangements while also citing
favorably Justice O’Connor’s arguments in the concurrence.109 Illinois
Tool Works presented a tying arrangement whereby the defendant sold
its patented printheads (the tying product) to printer manufacturers on
the condition that the printer manufacturers agree to purchase ink (the
tied product) for the printheads exclusively from the defendant.110 The
Court focused its analysis of the agreement on whether the record
supported the appellate court’s finding that the defendant’s patent on

105

Id. at 41 (O’Connor’s requirements for a rule of reason inquiry are: (1)
market power in the tying product, (2) a substantial threat of market power in the
tied product, and (3) a coherent economic basis for treating the products as distinct).
106
Id.
107
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1288 (2006)
(agreeing with Justice O’Connor’s argument that “the presumption that a patent
always gives the patentee significant market power” is improper in assessing market
power in the tying product); Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo.
Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 210 (7th Cir. 1985); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics,
Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986); Hylton supra note 61, at 479 (contending
that Justice O’Connor’s rule of reason analysis “would have brought contractual
tying doctrine in line with the technological integration case law developed in lower
courts”); 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & EINER ELHAUGE
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1737c (2d ed. 2004).
108
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291 (favoring the Jefferson Parish majority’s
standards for addressing tying arrangements).
109
See Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. 1281.
110
Id. at 1284.
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the tying product inferred market power in the tying product’s
market.111
In reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Court held that a
patent on a tying product does not infer market power in the tying
product’s market.112 This holding ran counter to the dictum in
Jefferson Parish regarding a patent’s effect on market power.113 The
Court explained its decision that a patent no longer infers market
power: “after our decision in Jefferson Parish repeated the patentequals-market-power presumption [citation omitted], Congress
amended the Patent Code to eliminate that presumption in the patent
misuse context.”114 Because the basis for inferring market power from
patents was revoked,115 the Court determined “it would be anomalous
to preserve the presumption” of market power from the existence of a
patent.116 This result is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s argument in
her Jefferson Parish concurrence that the existence of a patent alone is
insufficient to demonstrate that a seller possesses sufficient market
power.117
While the Illinois Tool Works Court dismissed the inference of
market power from a patent explained in the Jefferson Parish decision,
it also explicitly recognized that the general per se test explicated in
Jefferson Parish is the proper analysis for tying arrangements.118 The
Court now seems to require the same proof of market power necessary
to engage in forcing119 in cases involving intellectual property holders
as it does in cases not involving intellectual property holders (such as
111

Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir.

2005).
112

Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291.
See supra note 95.
114
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1290.
115
See supra discussion on the history of tying arrangements in Section I(A).
116
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1290.
117
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 n.7 (1984)
118
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291 (holding that “tying arrangements
involving patented products should be evaluated under the standards applied in cases
like Fortner II and Jefferson Parish”).
119
See supra note 93.
113
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Jefferson Parish).120 In the short period of time since the Court’s
analysis in Illinois Tool Works, its holding has already caused some
confusion in the lower courts with respect to the application of the
Jefferson Parish per se tying analysis.121
D. The Seventh Circuit and the “Economic Interest” Requirement
Some circuits have required the plaintiff to show an additional
element before the court will find a tying arrangement is unlawful per
se. This element, the “economic interest” requirement, first surfaced in
the Fourth Circuit in 1958.122 Although the requirement’s direct
applicability to the per se tying test was uncertain,123 other circuits
began to employ the economic interest requirement in their per se
tying arrangement analyses.124
The Seventh Circuit announced its approval of the economic
interest requirement in Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v.
Sealy.125 This 1978 holding cited a Sixth Circuit case in stating “there
is no illegal tying arrangement where a ‘tying’ company has absolutely
no financial interest in the sales” of the tied company.126
120

Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291 (stating, “[w]hile some [tying
arrangements involving patented products] are still unlawful, such as those that are
the product of a true monopoly or a marketwide conspiracy [citations omitted], that
conclusion must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than
by a mere presumption” of market power from the existence of a patent).
121
See Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2006).
122
Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958).
123
See Eric D. Young, The Economic Interest Requirement in the Per Se
Analysis of Tying Arrangements: A Worthless Inquiry, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353,
1364-65 (1990) (explaining that “Miller addressed two separate claims” and that “the
first part of the opinion [in Miller], which identified an economic interest
requirement, did not even address tying arrangements”).
124
See Roberts v. Elaine Powers Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F.2d 1476, 1478-81
(9th Cir. 1983); Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir.
1979); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 835 (7th Cir.
1978); Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934, 939 (6th Cir. 1964).
125
Ohio-Sealy Mattress, 585 F.2d 821 at 835.
126
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Carl Sandburg Village
Condominium Association No. 1 v. First Condominium Development
Co.,127 written by Judge Flaum exactly one year after Jefferson
Parish,128 reaffirmed the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the economic
interest requirement in its tying arrangement analysis. Unlike the
Reifert case, the holding of Carl Sandburg Village hinged on the
application of the economic interest requirement.129 The alleged tying
arrangement in Carl Sandburg Village involved the sale of
condominium units (the tying product) conditioned on the signing of
maintenance and management contracts (the tied service) with a
particular service provider.130 The condominium developer and the
provider of management and maintenance services were unaffiliated
entities.131 The Carl Sandburg Village court upheld the arrangement at
issue because the plaintiff failed to “establish the necessary economic
interest element of the tying seller in the tied product market.”132
The court justified its implementation of the economic interest
requirement by noting that it is used “by courts in the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,”133 and by reciting
policy concerns raised in Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson Parish
127

758 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Carl Sandburg Vill., however, affirmed a
district court’s holding from a year prior to the Supreme Court’s Jefferson Parish
decision. See Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co. 586
F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
129
Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 209.
130
Id. at 205
131
Id.
132
Id. at 209.
133
Id. at 208. Since the Carl Sandburg Village decision, the Second Circuit has
expressly rejected the economic interest requirement in Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s
House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514 (2d Cir. 1989); the Third Circuit has
omitted the requirement from its stated per se tying inquiry in Brokerage Concepts,
Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1998); the Eleventh Circuit has
continued use of the requirement, but expressed doubt in its applicability to tying
arrangements in Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1579 n.12
(11th Cir. 1991); and, the Tenth Circuit has adopted the requirement in Abraham v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 461 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2006).
128
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concurrence.134 The Seventh Circuit cited the Jefferson Parish
concurrence in stating that the goal of antitrust laws “in the tying
context is to prevent the economically harmful effects of tie-ins in
cases where a seller’s power in the market for the tying product is used
to create additional power in the market for the tied product.”135 This
policy consideration led the Carl Sandburg Village court to announce
that “[o]ne of the threshold criteria that a plaintiff must satisfy under . .
. the per se . . . analys[is] . . . is that there is a substantial danger that
the tying seller will acquire market power in the tied product
market.”136
Two and a half years later, the Seventh Circuit rethought its
position on the economic interest requirement in Parts and Electric
Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc. (“P&E”).137 The issue in P&E
was an arrangement whereby the defendant sold replacement parts for
electric motors (the tying product) to distributors on the condition that
the distributors also agree to purchase and “aggressively promote
minimum quantities” of electric motors (the tied product).138
The defendant in P&E failed to preserve the issue of whether the
economic interest requirement is necessary in a per se tying analysis
on appeal to the Seventh Circuit;139 nevertheless, the court addressed
134

Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 210 (stating that, in order to establish per
se illegality of a tying arrangement, a plaintiff must show that “there is a substantial
danger that the tying seller will acquire market power in the tied product market)
(citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36-39 (1984)
(O’Connor, J. concurring)).
135
Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 210 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2,
36-37 (O’Connor, J. concurring)); but see Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13 n.19
(explaining that “[t]he tying seller may be working toward a monopoly position in
the tied product, and even if he is not, the practice of tying forecloses other sellers of
the tied product and makes it more difficult for new firms to enter that market”)
(quoting Fortner Enter. v. United States Steel Corp. 394 U.S. 495, 512-14 (1969)
(White, J. dissenting)).
136
Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 210.
137
826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1987).
138
Id. at 713-14.
139
Id. at 714. The defendant did not object to the jury instruction that “market
power [in the tied product] is not relevant” during trial, nor did it proffer an
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the issue in dicta.140 The P&E court explained that Carl Sandburg
Village is controlled by Jefferson Parish.141 After analyzing the policy
considerations and the holding in Jefferson Parish, the Seventh Circuit
in P&E expressed a view that the Jefferson Parish majority does not
“articulate as a prerequisite to a tying violation that there be a
substantial danger that the tying seller will acquire market power in
the tied product market.”142
The P&E court recognized that Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson
Parish concurrence created a debate “among both judges and
scholars” on this topic.143 The Seventh Circuit concludes, however, by
noting “notwithstanding this debate, the requirement that there be a
threat of market power in the tied product has not been endorsed as a
requisite for a tying violation by a Supreme Court majority.”144
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO TYING ARRANGEMENTS IN
REIFERT V. SOUTH CENTRAL WISCONSIN MLS CORP.
In Reifert v. South Central Wisconsin MLS Corp.,145 the Seventh
Circuit put its stamp on a factual issue already confronted by several
other circuits.146 The plaintiff in Reifert was a real estate buyer’s agent
who alleged that the defendant (a real estate multiple listing service
instruction that market power in the tied product was important to the claim that the
tying arrangement was per se illegal. Id. at 717.
140
Id. at 718.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 718-19 (stating, “[o]n the other hand, Justice O’Connor, in a
concurring opinion joined by three other Justices, advocates in [Jefferson Parish]
that per se principles of liability be abandoned and that to establish a tying violation
‘there must be a substantial threat that the tying seller will acquire market power in
the tied-product market’”) (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 38 (O’Connor, J. concurring)).
144
Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 719.
145
450 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2006).
146
See Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1991);
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803 (1st Cir.
1988).
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(“MLS”))147 engaged in an illegal tying arrangement by conditioning
access to its services (the tying service) on the purchase of a
membership in a local Realtors Association (the tied service).148 This
same arrangement was addressed by the First and Eleventh Circuits
prior to Reifert. A brief look at theses circuits’ holdings on this issue
will assist the analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s Reifert opinion.
The MLS tying arrangement issue arose in Wells Real Estate v.
Greater Lowell Board of Realtors in 1988.149 The plaintiff in Wells
appealed to the First Circuit the district court’s directed verdict for the
defendants on his tying claim.150 The court in Wells upheld the
arrangement because the plaintiff failed to show that it foreclosed a
substantial volume of commerce.151 The First Circuit so held because
the plaintiff did not demonstrate a market for real estate board
membership affected by the arrangement.152 Conversely, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the plaintiff sufficiently pled that an MLS tying
arrangement was illegal per se in Thompson v. Metropolitan MultiList, Inc.153 The Thompson court found that the arrangement had a
“not insubstantial” effect on interstate commerce because the plaintiff
showed that another real estate membership board lost around 400
members due to the agreement.154

147

An MLS includes a computerized database of homes and properties for sale
in a particular market. Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., No. 04-C-969-S, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23431, *3 (W.D. Wisc. Aug. 25, 2005).
148
Reifert, 450 F.3d at 315.
149
Wells, 850 F.2d at 803.
150
Id. at 807.
151
Id. at 815.
152
Id. (explaining that there is no evidence that other brokers would have
purchased membership in other real estate boards “but for the power exerted by the
lure of the defendants’ MLS”).
153
934 F.2d 1566, 1579 (11th Cir. 1991).
154
Id. at 1577-78 (the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from an officer of a
competing real estate board stating that because of the cost of joining both boards,
400 members or potential members of the affiant’s board have quit or declined to
join).
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While the Wells and Thompson cases reached different outcomes
in assessing the sufficiency of real estate MLS tying claims, their
reasoning is consistent. Both cases can be read together to conclude
that a real estate MLS tying claim is insufficient where there is no
evidence of a real estate association that competes with the association
favored by the tie to MLS access.155 Therefore, Wells and Thompson
both properly require foreclosure of a substantial amount of commerce
in the tied product market (i.e. the market for real estate association
memberships) in assessing the legality of a real estate MLS tying
arrangement.
A. Reifert’s Tying Claim
The plaintiff in Reifert (“Mr. Reifert”) was a licensed real estate
broker located in south central Wisconsin.156 His membership in the
Realtors Association of South Central Wisconsin (“RASCW”) and his
use of South Central Wisconsin MLS’s (“SCWMLS”) services began
in 1988.157 He claimed that he had no desire to maintain his RASCW
membership, and that he belonged to RASCW only because it enabled
him to access SCWMLS.158 The plaintiff objected to the fees he was
forced to pay as a result of his membership in RASCW, and claimed
that he was forced to pay dues in excess of $2,000.00 for this
unwanted membership during a four-year period.159
Mr. Reifert’s ill-fated tying arrangement claim began in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.160
Judge John C. Shabaz ruled on cross motions for summary judgment

155

ROBERT D. BUTTERS, 10A-8 REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8.04 (MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC. 2006).
156
Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2006).
157
Id.
158
Id
159
Id.
160
Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., No. 04-C-969-S, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23431 (W.D. Wisc. Aug. 25, 2005).
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in favor of the defendant, SCWMLS.161 The district judge relied
heavily on the First Circuit’s Wells162 decision in his analysis of the
facts in Reifert.163 Consequently, summary judgment was granted for
the defendant because the plaintiff failed to show that “there are
competing providers of services in the tied product market whose sales
have been foreclosed by the tie between [the] MLS and [RASCW].”164
In differentiating this case from Thompson, Judge Shabaz noted that
the plaintiff did not offer “evidence of a single real estate professional
who has joined [another real estate association] instead of [RASCW]
or who has declined to join [a different real estate association] because
he or she is a member of [RASCW].”165 The plaintiff appealed this
decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. The Seventh Circuit Majority’s Analysis of Reifert
Judge Flaum (along with Judge Kanne) agreed with the district
court in his opinion on appeal.166 The Reifert majority first announced
the test it employs for tying arrangements; it explained “this Court
requires the plaintiff to prove four elements.”167 The court then set
forth the elements:
In order to establish the per se illegality of a tying
arrangement, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the tying
arrangement is between two distinct products or
services, (2) the defendant has sufficient economic
power in the tying market to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product, and (3) a
161

Id. at *16.
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803,
815 (1st Cir. 1988).
163
Reifert, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23431 at *9.
164
Id. at *16.
165
Id. at *13.
166
Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 321 (7th Cir. 2006).
167
Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
162
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not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce is
affected [citations omitted]. In addition, this circuit has
held that an illegal tying arrangement will not be found
where the alleged tying company has absolutely no
economic interest in the sales of the tied seller, whose
products are favored by the tie-in.168
Judge Flaum recognized that the plaintiff easily satisfies the first
two elements of this test.169 The Seventh Circuit, however, agreed with
the district court that the plaintiff could not show foreclosure of
commerce without evidence of competitors in the market for services
offered by RASCW.170
Part of the majority’s opinion in Reifert attempts to justify the per
se tying analysis declared therein.171 This is in direct response to the
concurrence’s disapproval of including the economic interest factor in
the per se tying test.172 In note 2 of his majority opinion, Judge Flaum
defends the use of the economic interest factor by stating that (1) the
Supreme Court recently approved of Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson
Parish concurrence,173 and (2) that the Supreme Court has not yet
disagreed with Carl Sandburg Village.174 Nevertheless, the majority
168

Id. (citing Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1. v. First Condo Dev.
Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207-08 (7th Cir. 1985)).
169
Reifert, 450 F.3d at 317 (stating that “access to the multi-listing service
cannot be obtained without purchasing the tied product, a Realtors Association
membership,” and that “SCWMLS has sufficient market power to restrain free
competition”).
170
Id.
171
Id. at 316-17.
172
Id. at 317 n.2.
173
Id. (stating “the Supreme Court recently adopted Justice O’Connor’s
reasoning in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 and held that tying arrangements
involving patents should be evaluated based on their market power ‘rather than
under the per se rule”) (citing Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct.
1281, 1291 (2006)).
174
Reifert, 450 F.3d at 317 n.2 (stating “[a]lthough the per se analysis of the
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 majority has not been expressly over-ruled, in the
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does not get a chance to employ the economic interest factor in Reifert
since it upholds summary judgment for the defendants due to the
plaintiff’s failure to plead that the arrangement forecloses a substantial
volume of commerce in the tied service market.175
C. Judge Wood’s Reifert Concurrence
While Judge Wood agreed with the majority’s conclusion in
Reifert, she did not subscribe to the majority’s use of the Carl
Sandburg Village test.176 She saw the Carl Sandburg Village test as
ignoring the Supreme Court’s per se approach in Jefferson Parish.177
Judge Wood held strong to the majority opinion in Jefferson Parish,
noting that it explained the per se test for tying, and that the Supreme
Court has not backtracked from its holding despite a very recent
opportunity to do so.178 She further explained that according to
Jefferson Parish, per se treatment is appropriate where forcing179 is
probable, and forcing is probable if a substantial volume of commerce
is foreclosed by the arrangement and it is probable that the seller has
market power in the tying product.180
In refusing to acquiesce to the majority’s Carl Sandburg Village
test, Judge Wood approved of the test propounded by the D.C. Circuit
intervening twenty-one years since Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo Ass’n No. 1, the
Supreme Court has not found occasion to disagree with this Circuit’s approach”).
175
Id. at 320 (explaining that because the plaintiff failed to meet the third
requirement, the court need not “address whether SCWMLS has a sufficient
economic interest in the sales of the tied product to satisfy the fourth element of an
unlawful tying arrangement”).
176
Id. at 323 (Wood, J. concurring).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 322-23 (explaining the recent Ill. Tool Works decision: “Illinois Tool
Works . . . stands only for the proposition that a plaintiff must prove that a holder of
intellectual property has ‘either the degree or the kind of market power that enables
him to force customers’ to purchase the tied product,” and if a plaintiff can, “then the
framework established by Jefferson Parish continues to apply).
179
See note 93, supra.
180
Reifert, 450 F.3d at 322 (Wood, J. concurring); see Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-19 (1984).
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in United States v. Microsoft Corp.181 This test sets forth four elements
to a per se tying violation: (1) the tying and tied goods are two
separate products; (2) the defendant has market power in the tying
product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice but to
purchase the tied product from it (i.e. a tie actually exists); and (4) the
tying arrangement forecloses a substantial volume of commerce.182
Noticeably absent from the foregoing is any semblance of the
economic interest requirement from Carl Sandburg Village. Using this
test, Judge Wood still agreed with the majority that the plaintiff’s
claim failed because he did not offer evidence of any foreclosure of
commerce by the tying arrangement.183 Specifically, Judge Wood
explained that according to the record “no one refrained from joining
any other organization because of the cost of membership” in
RASCW, and therefore the plaintiff’s tying claim fails.184
In the concurrence’s final paragraph, Judge Wood succinctly
restates her position on the majority’s tying arrangement analysis.185
She summarizes:
Analytically, the majority may well be right that the
rule of reason approach it sees in [Carl Sandburg
Village] [citation omitted] would be a more sensible
way to approach all tying cases. But it is not for this
court to anticipate the Supreme Court’s overruling of its
earlier decisions, even if the passage of time and the
impact of later cases that create doctrinal tensions are
evident to all.186

181

253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech.
Servs. Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992), and Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-18
(1984)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 932 (2001).
182
Reifert, 450 F.3d at 323 (Wood, J. concurring).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.

498
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/3

28

Mallon: Relaxing the Noose Around Tying Arrangements: <em>Reifert v. Sout

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

Judge Wood asserts that the Seventh Circuit should have limited
itself “to pointing out the problems [it] see[s] and then attempting to
apply the law as it stands”187 as the court did in Khan v. State Oil
Co.188 According to Judge Wood, the “law as it stands” forbids adding
Carl Sandburg Village’s economic incentive requirement to the
Jefferson Parish per se tying framework.189
III. TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE
REQUIREMENT
The disagreement between the majority and the concurrence in the
Seventh Circuit’s Reifert decision exemplifies the difficulty the circuit
courts have endured in applying the per se tying analysis. Differing
views on Jefferson Parish’s policy and its stated per se analysis have
polarized the proponents and critics of the economic interest
requirement.

187

Id.
In Khan v. State Oil Co, the Seventh Circuit applied the per se rule to
vertical maximum price fixing pursuant to the then-authoritative Supreme Court case
law despite its “increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations” because “the Supreme
Court has told the lower federal courts, in increasingly emphatic, even strident,
terms, not to anticipate an overruling of a decision by the Court.” 93 F.3d 1358,
1363, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3
(1997).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously decided to change the
law because of the well-reasoned attacks against the per se standard for vertical
maximum price fixing. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 7. Notably the Supreme Court praised
the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of the case, stating “[t]he Court of Appeals was
correct in applying [stare decisis] despite disagreement with [previous Supreme
Court case law], for it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its
precedents.” Id. at 20.
189
Reifert, 450 F.3d at 323 (Wood, J. concurring).
188
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A. The Construction and Justification of the Economic Interest
Requirement
As stated above, certain circuits, including the Seventh Circuit,
have used the economic interest requirement in assessing tying
arrangements under the per se analysis.190 The policy justification for
this requirement is that “when the seller of the tying goods has no
interest in the sale of the tied product, he is not using his power in the
tying product market to invade a second market.”191 Therefore, courts
using the factor reason that the absence of a tying seller’s economic
interest in the tied product indicates that the agreement “ha[s] no anticompetitive impact upon the market for the tied product or service.”192
The Carl Sandburg Village court attempted to clarify what
constitutes an economic interest in the tied market.193 The Seventh
Circuit stated that a tying seller’s economic interest in the sales of the
tied product does not have to be direct in the sense that the seller of the
tying product also produces the tied product; the tying seller must
simply have some form of interest in the sale of the tied product, “such
as the receipt of a commission or rebate.”194 However, Judge Flaum
also recognized that “the economic interest requirement is not met
where a plaintiff merely alleges that the tying seller is receiving
substantial revenue as a result of his sale of two products as a
package.”195 The plaintiff in Carl Sandburg Village pled that the tying
seller realized economic benefit because the tied seller concealed
190

See Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 461 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir.
2006); James B. Beard v. Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1990); Carl
Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203 (7th Cir.
1985).
191
Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 208; see also 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 15, ¶ 1709e5 (stating that a tying seller “who lacks an economic interest
in the tied market can hardly gain incremental revenue or exploit his customers in
any additional way when it takes nothing from the seller of the second product”).
192
Beard, 912 F.2d at 141.
193
Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 208.
194
Id.
195
Id.
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defects in condominiums, thereby allowing the tying seller to sell
more condominiums at a higher price.196 According to the Seventh
Circuit, this benefit did not comply with the definition of an
“economic benefit,”197 thus the plaintiff’s complaint was deficient and
dismissal was proper.198
The Sixth Circuit has perhaps been the most vehement defender
of the economic interest requirement. In Beard v. Parkview Hospital,
the Sixth Circuit upheld a tying arrangement on the grounds that the
defendant received no direct economic benefit from the provider of the
tied service.199 The court used this opportunity to contend that
requiring a plaintiff to show an economic interest in order to condemn
a tying arrangement as illegal per se is consistent with the Jefferson
Parish holding.200
In Beard, the Sixth Circuit states that it is “unpersuaded that the
‘direct economic benefit’ requirement . . . has been displaced” by
Jefferson Parish.201 It necessarily recognized that the Jefferson Parish
majority “did not state that the seller of a tying product or service must
secure a direct economic benefit from sales of a tied product or
service” for per se illegality of a tying violation.202 However, the court
contended that since the Jefferson Parish decision was premised on an
absence of market power in the tying service, its silence on the
economic interest requirement should not be construed as disapproval

196

Id.
Id. at 209 (stating that “a plaintiff must show that the tying arrangement
involves a seller who competes in the tying product’s line of commerce as well as
participates for profit in the tied product market”) (citing Rodrigue v. Chrysler Corp.,
421 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. La. 1976)).
198
Carl Sandburg Vill., 758 F.2d at 209.
199
912 F.2d 138, 144 (6th Cir. 1990). The tying arrangement in Beard
involved an agreement whereby patients receiving care at a hospital (the tying
service) could only use radiologists from a single radiology firm (the tied service).
Id. at 139.
200
Id. at 141-43.
201
Id. at 142.
202
Id.
197
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of the requirement.203 It also stated that, while Jefferson Parish did not
list the economic interest requirement as a part of the per se test, the
requirement is “consistent with the Court’s explanation of what an
illegal tying arrangement is.”204 The Beard court alleges that the
Supreme Court’s condemnation of the use of power in the tying
market to impair competition in the tied market leads to the conclusion
that arrangements where the tying seller has no economic interest in
the tied market are harmless because the tying seller “is not attempting
to invade the alleged tied product or service market.”205 The Sixth
Circuit concluded by rejecting a contrary construction of Jefferson
Parish from the Second Circuit206 and upholding the tying
arrangement because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the economic
interest requirement.207
Several erudite antitrust scholars also favor the economic interest
requirement, and offer compelling economic justifications for its
implementation.208 Professors Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert
Hovenkamp argue that “[a]llowing the allegedly tied customers to
obtain the tied product from suppliers in which the defendant has no
financial interest ends most or all of the fears underlying the per se
rule against tying.”209 These fears are allayed in the absence of a tying
seller’s economic interest in the tied market for four reasons: (1) the
defendant cannot gain power in the tied market by requiring customers
to patronize unrelated firms there; (2) giving the tied firm the ability to
charge supra-competitive prices in the tied market would normally
injure the tying firm (because customers would be less inclined to
203

Id.
Id. (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15
(1984) “if [market power in the tying market] is used to impair competition on the
merits in another market, a potentially inferior product may be insulated from
competitive pressures”).
205
Beard, 912 F.2d at 142.
206
Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514
(2d Cir. 1989).
207
Beard, 912 F.2d at 143.
208
9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1726d.
209
Id. at ¶ 1726a.
204
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participate in the agreement and purchase the tying product); (3)
exploitation of power over the tying product (such as price
discrimination) cannot result from the arrangement if the defendant
receives no portion of the revenues from the tied product; and (4) once
the three preceding functions of tying arrangements are put aside, the
alleged tie-in is likely to be pro-competitive in both motivation and
effect.210
B. Attacks Against the Economic Interest Requirement’s
Implementation in the Per Se Tying Analysis
The economic interest requirement has fallen into disfavor among
some courts and scholars since the Jefferson Parish opinion.211 Even
the Seventh Circuit, who favored the inquiry in Carl Sandburg Village,
and in the majority of its recent decision in Reifert, has voiced
disapproval of the requirement’s use in the per se tying analysis.212
Opponents of the economic interest requirement’s implementation in
the per se tying analysis express that the Jefferson Parish majority
“focused primarily on the anticompetitive effect of tying arrangements
and the resultant harm to consumer choice in the tied-product
market,”213 and that the predatory aspects of a tie (the invasion of the
tied market by the tying seller, as explained in Carl Sandburg
Village)214 are not the sole reason for their condemnation.215
Judge Wood explained in her Reifert concurrence that the
Jefferson Parish majority held that a tying arrangement with two
different products is illegal per se where “a substantial volume of
210

9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1726a (1991).
See, e.g., Gonzalez, 880 F.2d at 1514; Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling
Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1987); Young, supra note 123; Warren S. Grimes,
Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market
Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 263 (1994).
212
Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 712.
213
Gonzalez, 880 F.2d at 1517.
214
See Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758
F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1985).
215
Young, supra note 123, at 1365.
211
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commerce is foreclosed by the arrangement,” and where the “seller [of
the tying product] has market power.”216 On these grounds, she
objected to the Reifert majority’s use of the economic interest factor as
“anticipat[ing] the Supreme Court’s overruling of its earlier decisions”
by adding another requirement to the per se tying analysis.217 While
Judge Wood admits that the test the majority applies may “be a more
sensible way to approach all tying cases,” she refuses to accede to the
test and instead opts to “take a more cautious approach, and leave
further developments in tying law to the high court.”218
Judge Wood’s concurring opinion in Reifert did not mark the first
time the Seventh Circuit disapproved of the economic interest
requirement’s implementation in the per se tying analysis. It expressed
doubt in the requirement’s relevance to the Jefferson Parish per se
tying analysis in P&E.219 The court recognized that Jefferson Parish
controls Carl Sandburg Village (decided two years prior to P&E), and
examined Justice Stevens’ Jefferson Parish majority opinion in-depth
to determine whether the holding endorsed the economic interest
requirement approved by the Seventh Circuit in Carl Sandburg
Village.220 Conversely, the Carl Sandburg Village opinion cited only
Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson Parish concurrence in asserting that
“[o]ne of the threshold criteria that a plaintiff must satisfy under . . .
the per se . . . analys[is] . . . is that there is a substantial danger that the
tying seller will acquire market power in the tied product market.”221
In P&E, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Jefferson Parish
majority quoted Justice White’s dissent in Fortner I with approval:
“[t]he tying seller may be working toward a monopoly position in the
tied product and, even if he is not, the practice of tying forecloses other
216

Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 322 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Wood, J. concurring).
217
Id. at 323.
218
Id. at 321-323.
219
Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.
1987).
220
Id. at 718.
221
Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d
203, 210 (7th Cir. 1985).
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sellers of the tied product and makes it more difficult for new firms to
enter that market.”222 It used this language to explain that Justice
Stevens’ opinion “does not seem to suggest any role for the threat of
market power in the tied product market as a factor in the [per se
tying] analysis.”223 While the P&E court conducted the Seventh
Circuit’s most thorough analysis of the economic interest
requirement’s place under the Jefferson Parish majority’s opinion, it
specifically designated its analysis as mere dicta.224
However, the Second Circuit approved of the Seventh Circuit’s
dicta in P&E, and expressly adopted it in its holding in Gonzalez.225
This court agreed with the Seventh Circuit in P&E that the Supreme
Court has not yet “cut back on the application of tie-in doctrine by
incorporating [the economic interest] requirement into the test for an
illegal tying arrangement.”226 For this reason, the Gonzalez court
explicitly held that “[t]he majority in Jefferson Parish does not require
any ‘economic interest’ by the tying seller in the tied-product
market.”227
222

Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 718 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13 n.19 (1984) (quoting Fortner Enters. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513 (1969) (White, J. dissenting)) (emphasis added in
P&E).
223
Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 718.
224
Id. at 719 (stating “whatever the law may be or ought to become, in this
case the question is moot since the issue of threatened market power in the tied
product market was waived by [the defendant]”).
225
Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514,
1517 (2d Cir. 1989).
226
Id. (citing Parts & Elec. Motors, 826 F.2d at 718 n.5); see also Gordon B.
Spivack and Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak: Enlightened Antitrust Analysis and Traditional
Tying Law, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, n.34 (1993) (explaining that the Supreme Court
in Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), by reaffirming the
Jefferson Parish per se tying inqury, “imposed no requirement that the plaintiff
prove that market power in the tied product results, or is likely to result from the
tie”).
227
Gonzalez, 880 F.2d at 1517. This court concluded by expressing that the
per se tying analysis has “weaknesses” and that it is “virtually certain” that the
agreement at issue “would survive scrutiny” under the rule of reason; nevertheless
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While the foregoing arguments against the economic interest
requirement mainly address its propriety in the Jefferson Parish per se
framework, its effectiveness in a per se tying analysis has also been
questioned by several commentators.228 One commentator contends
both that the requirement has no place under the Jefferson Parish
framework and that it is irrelevant to the per se structure.229 Under this
commentator’s analysis, “all ties restrict the freedom of tied-product
buyers to purchase products based on the merits of that product,
resulting in a lessening of competition in the tied product market,” and
the “economic interest requirement ignores these effects.”230 He
concludes that the critical question is the degree of foreclosure in the
tied market, “not the tying seller’s motivation for imposing the tie.”231
Practical litigation concerns prompted another commentator to
criticize the economic interest requirement.232 According to this
commentator, effectively “tracing the financial links” between certain
types of entities233 may prove virtually impossible for a plaintiff.234
According to him, such a task “should be wholly unnecessary if the
elements of a harmful tie have been demonstrated.”235

the court acknowledged that it “must, of course, adhere to the views of a majority of
the Supreme Court.” Id. at 1519.
228
Young, supra note 123; Grimes, supra note 211.
229
Young, supra note 123
230
Id. at 1365-66.
231
Id. at 1368.
232
Grimes, supra note 211.
233
Id. at 318. Specifically, the author of this article references separate
subsidiaries of a parent corporation. See Grimes, supra note 211.
234
Grimes, supra note 211, at 318.
235
Id.; see also Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev.
Co., 758 F.2d 203, 209 (7th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging that “it might be difficult for
a plaintiff to allege the economic interest element in a case of secret rebates or
discounts where the plaintiff has not had the benefit of discovery”).
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C. The Economic Interest Requirement Controversy in Reifert
However well-justified the policy considerations favoring the
economic interest requirement may be, the circuit courts must
remember that the Jefferson Parish majority’s per se analysis
continues to dictate the legality of tying arrangements. Resultantly, the
Seventh Circuit’s stated analysis of the tying arrangement in Reifert
was incorrect. While the outcome of the case was unaffected by the
Reifert majority’s error,236 Judge Wood’s more conservative
concurrence correctly stated the application of existing Supreme Court
precedent.
As discussed above, Jefferson Parish explicitly stated that a tying
arrangement involving two separate products or services is illegal per
se where the tying seller has market power, and a substantial amount
of commerce is affected.237 The Court favored the idea that even if a
tying seller is not working toward a monopoly position in the tied
market, tying arrangements still have anticompetitive consequences by
foreclosing other sellers of the tied product from the tied product
market.238 Leading up to Jefferson Parish, a body of circuit-court case
law grew favoring the economic interest requirement in the per se
tying analysis; but the Court in Jefferson Parish, while not explicitly
addressing the economic interest requirement, “refocused the inquiry”
on the degree of foreclosure of commerce (as an anticompetitive
effect) in the tied market, “rather than on the tying seller’s motivation
to invade a second market.”239 The Seventh Circuit itself observed that
Jefferson Parish “does not seem to suggest any role” for the

236

Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS, 450 F.3d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 2006) (the case’s
dismissal for failure to show foreclosure in the tied product market made it
unnecessary for the majority to address whether the defendant had “a sufficient
economic interest in the sales of the tied product to satisfy the [economic interest
requirement]”).
237
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-17 (1984).
238
Id. at 13 n.19 (quoting Fortner Enter. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 513 (1969) (White, J. dissenting)).
239
Young, supra note 123, at 1367.
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motivation of the tying seller to gain market power in the tied product
market as a factor in the per se tying analysis.240
Nevertheless, Judge Flaum, citing the Carl Sandburg Village
decision that he penned in 1985, reasserted the economic interest
requirement in Reifert. Judge Wood correctly noted that this aspect of
the Reifert opinion is in “tension with the governing Supreme Court
doctrine.”241 As stated in Section II, the Reifert concurrence’s “more
cautious approach,” which omitted the economic interest requirement
and mirrored the tying analysis expressed in Jefferson Parish,
warranted the same result as the majority.242 The majority and
concurring opinions in the Reifert case differed in that the concurrence
remained faithful to the Supreme Court’s instruction to the circuit
courts “not to anticipate an overruling of a decision by the Court.”243
While the economic interest requirement referenced by the Reifert
majority may assist in determining the likelihood that the tying seller
is attempting to parlay market power in the tying market into market
power in the tied market, this inquiry has no place in the Jefferson
Parish per se tying analysis. Because the Supreme Court has never
recognized the economic interest requirement as a prerequisite in the
per se tying analysis, I would join in Judge Wood’s concurrence
wherein she applied the Jefferson Parish per se standard to reach her
holding, but also expressed doubt in the effectiveness of the analysis.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PER SE TYING ANALYSIS
The turmoil and tumult created by the per se tying analysis is
obvious through the divided reasoning between Reifert’s majority and
240

Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712, 718 (7th
Cir. 1987).
241
Reifert 450 F.3d at 321 (Wood, J. concurring).
242
Id. at 321-23.
243
Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other
grounds, State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (stating “[t]he Court of Appeals
was correct in applying [stare decisis] despite disagreement with [previous Supreme
Court case law], for it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its
precedents”).
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concurring opinions. Moreover, the circuits’ argument regarding the
economic interest requirement’s applicability bespeaks a problem with
the per se tying analysis itself. Judge Flaum, writing the Reifert
majority opinion, observed that while the Supreme Court has never
expressly overruled the per se tying test evinced in Jefferson Parish, it
recently adopted Justice O’Connor’s reasoning (from her Jefferson
Parish concurrence) with respect to tying arrangements involving
patents.244 Justice O’Connor’s call to jettison the per se standard for
tying arrangements has been endorsed as sound policy by scholars and
judges.245 Even Judge Wood, in her Reifert concurrence, speculated
that a rule of reason analysis may “be a more sensible way to approach
all tying cases.”246
Antitrust law’s per se analysis is beneficial in that it provides
clarity and simplicity to courts assessing firms’ commercial
behavior.247 To effectuate this end, per se illegality eliminates an indepth market analysis as to the motivations of anticompetitive
behavior and a balancing of the positive and negative effects of such
behavior.248 Therefore, it is reserved for agreements or actions deemed
so anticompetitive that they warrant a presumption of illegality
regardless of their actual effects.249
The per se tying analysis fails in providing clarity and simplicity
to courts assessing tying arrangements.250 The market power
requirement creates an inherent difficulty for courts.251 Uncertainty
244

Reifert, 450 F.3d at 317 n.2 (citing Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006)). In Ill. Tool Works, the Supreme Court held that existence of
a patent on the tying product does not automatically infer sufficient market power in
the tying market. 126 S.Ct 1281.
245
See supra note 107.
246
Reifert 450 F.3d at 323 (Wood, J. concurring).
247
Phillip Areeda, Excerpts from National Institute on Litigating “Rule of
Reason” Cases: The Rule of Reason – A Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST
L.J. 571 (1986).
248
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10 (1984).
249
Id.
250
9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1730b.
251
Id.
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about market definition,252 the importance of intellectual property,253
and the importance of market imperfections254 have clouded the clarity
of the per se tying analysis. The separate product requirement has also
created confusion, and has “become highly indeterminate and often
metaphysical.”255 Resultantly, Justice O’Connor was quite justified in
contending that “tying doctrine incurs the costs of a rule-of-reason
approach without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for the
extensive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic of the
rule of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements
that economic analysis would show to be beneficial.”256
Additionally, a more extensive economic understanding of tying
arrangements shows that they are capable of many procompetitive
effects.257 Among these redeeming characteristics are (1) the
protection of product quality, (2) the lowering of production costs, (3)
the increase of competition through indirect price cuts, and (4) the
easing of entry into new markets.258 A tying arrangement can protect a
product’s quality by ensuring that the necessary supplies or repairs are
provided or performed exclusively by the defendant.259 Moreover,
selling or producing two products together can reduce a seller’s costs,
and this reduction may be passed on to the consumer.260 Producers
may also combine two products and sell them for less than the sum of
252

Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d
468, 480 (3d Cir. 1992).
253
Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006).
254
Compare Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27 (stating that market
imperfections “do not generate the kind of market power that justifies condemnation
of tying”), with Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451
(1992) (finding market power from market imperfections).
255
9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1730b.
256
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2 at 34 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
257
9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1703g.
258
Id.
259
Id.; but see Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (arguing
that this goal can be accomplished just as easily by informing the consumer of the
necessary procedures to maintain the quality of the tying product).
260
9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1703g.
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the price of each individual product; while rival firms may object to
this tactic, consumers will realize a benefit in a lower purchase
price.261 Further, a tie can guarantee a seller a certain volume of
patronage upon entering a new market.262 Again, while competitors in
the tied market may object to the tie, it would be procompetitive in the
tied market (as long as it does not foreclose a large portion of the tied
market) even if the tying seller had a monopoly in the tying market.263
Today’s understanding of tying arrangements would presumably
lead to a rule of reason approach in the absence of existing Supreme
Court precedent.264 However, the expansive body of Supreme Court
case law examined in Part I requires today’s courts to apply stare
decisis.265 While the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis in
American jurisprudence cannot be overstated,266 it is “not an
inexorable command.”267 The Supreme Court has explained that it will
detour from the stare decisis path only for articulable reasons, and
where the Court must bring its opinions into agreement with its
experience and newly ascertained facts.268
In his later years, Thomas Jefferson remarked that while “frequent
and untried changes in laws” are ill-advised, laws “must go hand in
hand with the progress of the human mind,” and “[a]s [the mind]
261

Id.
Id.
263
Id.
264
See id. at ¶ 1730c (“The reasons [favoring a rule of reason analysis] are so
forceful that one doubts that the courts, were they writing on a clean slate today,
would create the peculiar per se rule of today’s tying cases”).
265
Literally translated from Latin as “to stand by things decided,” this doctrine
requires courts to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again
in litigation. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
266
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) (stating that the doctrine
“permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather
than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our
constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact”).
267
Id. at 266.
268
Id. (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932)
(Brandeis, J. dissenting)).
262
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becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep
pace with the times.”269 In light of the current understanding of tying
arrangements, I believe that we should abolish the per se tying
standard. It eliminates the necessity of an inquiry into the
arrangement’s effects (some of which may benefit consumers), and
fails to create clarity and simplicity in assessing tying arrangements.
Thusly, the per se standard, as applied to tying arrangements, has
“most of the disadvantages of the standard rule of reason, without the
advantages of either” the rule of reason or the per se analysis.270
Further, I surmise that the per se analysis will one day be renounced
by the Supreme Court in favor of a rule of reason approach; this
change will be justified by the continuing difficulties the per se
analysis imposes on the courts, and the well-reasoned criticism of its
implementation.271
CONCLUSION
While prevailing opinion on the evils of tying arrangements has
changed since the early days of the Supreme Court’s per se stance,272
the per se analysis from the Jefferson Parish majority continues to
dictate the legality of tying arrangements.273 The Court will likely
269

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) (on file
with the Library of Congress).
270
9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1730b.
271
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33-47
(O’Connor, J. concurring); Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312 (7th
Cir. 2006); 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1730b.
272
Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949)
(stating that “tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition”), with Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1292
(2006) (explaining that “[m]any tying arrangements, even those involving patents
and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free, competitive market”).
273
Ill. Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1291 (endorsing the Jefferson Parish
majority’s tying framework).
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someday recognize that changes in policy considerations and
economic theory favor moving from the per se standard in assessing
tying arrangements to a rule of reason inquiry; but until that day
arrives, the circuit courts must implement the per se analysis evinced
in Jefferson Parish. Consequently, the Reifert majority’s failure to
operate within the existing Supreme Court doctrine was correctly
criticized by Judge Wood in her concurrence.
The Seventh Circuit’s approval of the economic interest factor
added another prerequisite to liability under the Supreme Court’s per
se tying analysis. It is the Supreme Court’s decision alone274 whether
to relax the per se noose around tying arrangements by adding more
prerequisites to the analysis, or whether to untie the noose all together
by abolishing the per se analysis in favor of a rule of reason approach.
Although the Reifert holding was not affected by the majority’s error,
its analysis anticipated the overruling of existing Supreme Court
precedent, and as a result improperly included the economic interest
factor in its per se tying analysis.

274

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
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